property!" 9 . The changing tenor was also registered in the fact that prison sentences for theft of personal property stiffened considerably in the USSR over time, going from 3 months in the 1920s to 5-6 years in a labor camp by the late 1940s 10 . By 1957 taxes on inheritance were all but removed across the Soviet Union and the East Bloc, leading one Western commentator to snigger that the Soviet Union was actually "a more inheritancefriendly environment than its western counterpart" 11 . Homes, cars, boats, dachas, books, jewelry, furniture, musical instruments and household goods were all to be formally protected 12 . A 1961 Soviet ordinance extended the personal property provisions laid out in the 1936 constitution to all Soviet satellite states 13 . Such issues particularly bedeviled hardcore East German ideologues and lawmakers. After 1945 German lawmakers joined forces across the occupational zones to rehabilitate the old German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) of 1900 as the cornerstone of a post-Nazi constitutional order. This civil code was based on a set of classic liberal "negative freedoms" that assured the liberties of free, private citizens against the undue encroachments of the state. It became a key "lieu de mémoire" in its own right, to the extent that it served as the basis of a kind of unified German legal culture after the war 14 . But with the intensification of the Cold War and the GDR's stepped-up effort to accelerate the reach of "socialist legality" (sozialistische Gesetzlichkeit) came new calls to "modernize" the code. Ulbricht himself led the charge, citing Marx that a socialist civil code must aim "to bring people out of social isolation and free them from the bourgeois mindset" 15 . A movement arose in the late 1950s to "de-liberalize" civil law by dissolving any remaining individual rights in the name of the vaunted "people's property" 16 . This reform initiative ultimately ran aground, however, mainly because the Soviet Union objected that such a radical overhaul of civil law was out of step with what was practiced elsewhere in the socialist world. In the end, the GDR essentially followed the lead of the Soviet Union in terms of personal property protection. Inheritance, for example, remained a key feature of East Germany's Civil Code (even after its radical revision in 18 . While Ulbricht's successor, Erich Honecker, may have dissolved virtually all privately-owned enterprises in 1972, private homes and property remained expressly protected 19 . His new 1975 code recognized the individual desire for goods as fundamental, and protected the right to -and ownership of -consumer objects as basic to all citizens 20 . But precisely because GDR civil law legally preserved a dangerous "non-socialist" sphere, there was broad concern that it served as a kind of juridical Trojan Horse within the country's fortress of "socialist law and justice." Reformers consequently moved to close the gap between state and citizen by other means. Crucial here was the new ideological justification deriving from Stalin's idea of the "active superstructure," which held that state actions (and not just economic transformation) were equally important in cultivating socialist consciousness and citizenship. Law was singled out as particularly decisive in this regard, as East German jurists busied themselves with using courts -and in particular civil courts --to help combat these new social dangers 21 .
Personal Property and Popular Justice
So much for theory, but what about the popular understanding of private property? It is in this context that these petty claims "social courts," or gesellschaftliche Gerichte -set up in the Soviet Union and across the East Bloc in the early 1960s -are such a revealing source of everyday socialist life, and I will use the GDR's own "dispute commissions," or Schiedskommissionen, as an example. Briefly these commissions were small informal "comrade courts" established in GDR residential areas in 1963 in order to address cases of minor civil conflict and initiate citizens into the workings of 'socialist legality" 22 were explicitly designed to complement the successful 'conflict commissions,' or Konfliktkommissionen, which had been created ten years before as lay tribunals to deal with minor cases arising in workplace. The brief of the dispute commissions, by contrast, was to settle quarrels between neighbors over sundry petty infractions and 'antisocial activities,' with the express aim of re-educating offenders. By 1989 there were some 56,917 people serving as elected 'lay assessors' on nearly 6 000 dispute commissions nationwide 23 . By the end of 1967, there were over 5 700 such citizen courts across the country, each one of which heard on average between 3 and 5 cases per month, sometimes more 24 . So proud were GDR authorities of these dual 'social courts' that were cited as late as 1989 as 'incontestable signs of the robustness of our people-oriented socialist justice system and the lawfulness of the socialist state' 25 . Since 1990 the GDR civil court system has remained one of most potent sources of nostalgia for many East German citizens 26 , even if the sphere of East German civil law was altogether ignored by the Enquete Commission's otherwise thorough efforts to 'work through the GDR past' in the name of post-Reunification democratization 27 . These courts primarily concerned infractions against "the people's property" as well as personal property 28 . In fact, by the mid-1960s property violations accounted for nearly 60% of all crimes in East Germany, and remained roughly at that level through the 1970s and 1980s 29 . Violations against the "people's property" covered such things as shoplifting, stealing equipment from factories and embezzlement, and made up half of the property crimes in the GDR from the 1960s through the late 1980s 30 . Personal property cases, by contrast, covered the gamut of petty claims, ranging from stolen mopeds to damaged sports equipment to scratched automobiles. A large number of property cases -like those of the more formal civil courts -concerned conflicts between renters and private landlords over unpaid rent and overdue house repairs. Others concerned battles between spouses and children over the inheritance of flats and personal items, or about how to in divide up household goods following a divorce. A good amount, too, dealt with conflicts between neighbours over property boundaries, usually regarding garden plots or overhanging trees. What is so remarkable about these property disputes (and this was just as true of the formal civil courts) was that the ruling Socialist Unity Party-ever-present in the rest of GDR life -was relatively absent in these proceedings, especially if they did not concern young people. Here the right to and protection of personal property was the main thing that mattered, giving the supposedly banished spectre of commodity fetishism a lively public forum. Indeed, these were by and large petit-bourgeois conflicts over apartments, gardens, garages, furniture and cars -what has been called the "tiny enclaves of self-determination in an otherwise tight and regimented world" 31 -whose causes and concerns were not altogether different from what exercised petty claims courts west of the Berlin Wall. To be sure, the potential usage of these courts for information-gathering was not lost on state authorities. One 1956 Ministry of Justice report, for example, stated that a principal element of the new courts was to gather information about social life that was otherwise hard to obtain, especially 'concerning the thousand small things that make life difficult for our people, the removal of which would significantly help ameliorate social relations' 32 . These courts might then be useful in helping confront 'the enemies of our state who try by all manner of sabotage, diversion and secret agency to undermine our goals' 33 . This was seen as all the more necessary, given that the people who usually filed private claimshousewives, self-employed workers and the retired -were considered the very people who remained largely outside the state's network of mass organizations. In fact, the original November 1953 social court ordinance was passed in direct reaction to the major political upheavals of June 16-17 earlier that year 34 . The problem for state officials was that residential areas -unlike the workplace -tended to resist state control. This was particularly so in the wake of the 1953 Uprising, as state officials found it difficult to penetrate housing communities. One July 1953 National Front report described the 'mood of the people' as wary and suspicious, and that the 'people are irritated by steppedup neighbourhood surveillance' 35 . A National Front report ten years later stated that residents were still sceptical of state organizations in residential areas, and that many citizens -especially youth -were not very involved in communal life or activities 36 . To overcome this resistance, the courts were to maintain close contacts with the police, National Front, residential supervisors and the formal justice system in identifying 'asocials' and 'rowdy behavior' among residents, particular young people 37 1968 expansion of the dispute commissions across the GDR was a direct response to the threat posed by the Prague Spring that year, as the courts were seen to be able to help identify problem areas and citizens more quickly than the police could 38 . True to Marxist ideology, the roots of this "antisocialist comportment" were invariably attributed to the catch-all bugbear, "capitalist behavior." Older residences were singled out as more prone to "asocial activity" on the grounds that around 20 % tended to be privately-owned properties, thus keeping alive what were called the "remnants of past worldviews" wherein citizens, as reports claimed, "still believe that they can live egotistically only for themselves" and have no understanding of the "foundations of socialist communal living" 39 . One 1971 Ministry of Justice guidebook for court jurists summed up the logic by saying that crime in the DDR "has it roots mainly in the influence of the imperial class enemy, in regressive thinking and lifestyles of a number of citizens, who have clung to the ideological holdovers of the [pre-socialist] past" 40 . Ironically, what exacerbated the problem was the coming of socialist prosperity. At first this may seem puzzling, given the common image of East European socialism as one of economic mismanagement, widespread privation and mass-produced misery. But during the early 1960s, the East Bloc -and East Germany in particular -was in the beginning phases of its Great Leap Forward in "consumer socialism." By that time the so-called standard of living had become a key ideological battleground of Cold War rivalry, as each system used economic success as a means of showcasing political legitimacy. At the USSR's 22 nd Party Congress in 1961, for example, Khrushchev stressed the central importance of "Everything for the People -Everything for the Welfare of the People!" 41 and each East Bloc leader followed suit in paying more heed to the 'citizen-consumer.' While its actual results may look meager to us now, everyday socialist life was indeed undergoing major transformation. A new socialist "mass culture" was beginning to materialize, complete with new shopping centers, mail-order catalogs, fashion, furniture, housewares and shiny consumer goods of all varieties 42 . This may have been good news for GDR economists and policymakers, but it also meant that there were many more goods for the law -and the courts -to honor and protect. Where the rudimentary social courts in the early 1950s were primarily concerned with relatively scarce personal property items like family jewelry and sewing machines, the 1960s courts were flooded with claims about the new fruit of socialist consumer culture, such as televisions, motorcycles, sports equipment, camping gear and automobiles. How important this was to GDR citizens was acknowledged by Ulbricht himself in 1960, who wrote that socialism 38 The old Marxist notion that the coming of communism meant that the state -and with it the law -would wither away hardly came to pass; in fact, the social court system was significantly expanded in the 1970s in the name of educating citizens about socialist rights and justice. At the 9 th Socialist Unity Party Congress in 1976, Honecker made clear that it was to help curb consumer desires, 'develop socialist society,' and 'civilize' the masses about the norms of socialism one case at a time 44 . As one guidebook put it, these courts were to serve as a ‚lever' in the ‚historical transformation of I into We,' one in which ‚personal rights are not to cut people off from society, but rather will have a law-abiding and collectivizing effect in protecting us from egotistical, undisciplined and unrefined behavior' 45 . But it was really morality itself that was deemed crucial in assuring that socialist society would not turn into its ideological enemy. The constitutional emphasis on 'the satisfaction of material and cultural needs' first articulated in Stalin's 1936 constitution, and later included verbatim in the civil codes of all socialist republics after 1945, including the GDR, was intended to curb the demons of 'surplus value' and unrestrained consumerism. The heavy emphasis on morals at the time -what Dorothee Wierling calls the state's 'educational dictatorship' -was scarcely limited to these courts, and could be seen throughout GDR society in the 1960s, as part of the desperate effort to hold together a society in the throes of febrile modernization and socialist transformation 46 . Indeed, the 1960s was the Golden Age of the socialist etiquette book, giving rise to a number of massproduced manners manuals that aimed to create new standards of 'socialist civility' in the realm of everyday interaction 47 . The courts' crusade to rehabilitate petty offenders was part in the GDR's broader 1960s social engineering project to remake society after the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 48 . That these infractions derived from a stubborn private property mentality thereby struck at the heart of the socialist project, and warranted serious attention. By the mid-1960s the courts had stepped up their mission to restore socialist norms of good behavior, often by hectoring offenders, shaming shirkers and demanding public apologies. Hardly a verdict was passed without impassioned Paul Betts, "Private Property and Public Culture : A Forgotten Chapter of East European Communist Life", Histoire@Politique. Politique, culture, société, N°7, janvier-avril 2009. paternalistic admonitions of socialist misbehavior; for the jurists, the infractions were not just moral failings, but affronts against the very power and possibility of socialism itself. Noteworthy, too, is that many of these social court cases (over half by the early 1970s onward) actually pivoted on insults, slander and defamation, that is, violations of citizen honor, as honor was defended in terms of the sacrosanct moral property of each individual socialist citizen. Just as in the Soviet Comrade Courts, defamation was therefore a key concern of these social courts, as they used shame and the public gaze to gainsay public contrition, issue reprimands and reaffirm socialist ideals of good behavior 49 . But by the mid-1970s on, these cases were characterized by a distinctive collapse of idealism, as the courts' 60s moralizing mission gave way to dryly adjudicating private property claims drained of its once-formidable zeal for social reform.
What can be said about these issues in the end ? First, these court records may be read as showing that East German society -despite propaganda to the contrary -was really battling over distinctly bourgeois notions of domestic order, propriety and the good life. The courts' growing sense of helplessness in combating "capitalist egotism" may then be seen as an admission of the very limits of the socialist reconstruction of everyday citizens, as well as an implicit acknowledgment that these "pre-socialist" bourgeois attitudes were here to stay. In a world defined by scarcity and material want, personal property became even more important, and unsurprisingly became the very stuff of local social friction. The same went for the high percentage of cases concerning violations of honor. After all, it is precisely in societies characterized by little flow of goods and money that honor -as a kind of non-transferable private property -is held especially dear. That the state policed public debate as closely as it patrolled its national frontiers meant that these court confrontations between neighbors became one of the few places where citizens could vent their property grievances. But as always, this occurred within the strict limits of the GDR authoritarian state. That the social court system was developed and expanded in reaction to several 'system-critical' events -the 1953 Uprising, the 1961 erection of the Berlin Wall and the 1968 Prague Spring -underlines the state's effort to use the commissions to multiply its power and paternalistic reach. From the authorities' perspective, the citizen commissions helped track residential strife and non-conformists in the name of 'socialist community.' Nonetheless, in these residential disputes about personal property and individual honor, collectivist ideals often lost out, as complainants effectively reworked the 'I-We' relationship to personal ends. Emphasis instead fell on preserving citizens' own property from the abuse of others -be it their homes, belongings, domestic tranquility and/or personal reputation. As a result, the 'privatization' of social justice may be seen as an expression of increasing political pessimism. At the very least, these developments may go some way in explaining why the world of personal property -everyday objects 50 . But consigning these developments to some sort of facile "bourgeoisification" of GDR society overlooks other key issues. For instance, one could plausibly counter -and this is my second point -that what these court records ultimately demonstrate is a kind of citizen assertion of civil society. Doubtless this may seem peculiar, not least because an influential strand of GDR historiography has worked to turn Marx on his head, arguing that it was society, and not the state, that eventually withered away under state socialism. And yet, these court files amply show that a certain expression of civil society -based on the protection of property, domestic peace and even civility -developed at the local level over the years, and the social courts played their part in making this possible. To be clear, the GDR never came close to a classic liberal notion of civil society, since there was no critical public sphere, as Western-style civil rights, such as the freedom of speech, assembly and emigration, were essentially off-limits all the way through the late 1980s. The cozy relationship between the justice system -including the social courts -and the National Front and local police makes this perfectly plain, as noted in several cases discussed above. The key point is that GDR civil society did not develop -as it did in the West -against the state, but rather very much within it. But this is not to say that civil rights were a dead letter. After all, the 1975 Civil Code was an explicit effort to "materialize" civil rights, safeguarding a host of property protections and "subjective rights" for GDR citizens. This logic was firmly in keeping with socialist governments' understanding of civil rights at the time, to the extent that they saw the right to work, decent housing, health, higher education, and even "rest and relaxation" as fundamental human rights, as opposed to the "abstract" liberties celebrated by their Cold War rivals 51 . In the GDR and elsewhere, civil rights always remained subordinate to economic rights; but once personal property became a protected fixture of socialist civil law, its citizens began to think and act differently. Arguably, what they took to heart were the original claims of Marxism itself -social justice and material compensation. That the GDR Civil Code of 1975 was a bestseller across the country, having sold some 2 million copies to a population of 16.7 million, attests to socialism's own burgeoning "rights culture" 52 . However cynically citizens may have cited the code to advance their private claims, the point is that they embraced the law, the court system and ultimately the state itself as receptive organs for the defense of personal property. This leads me to my last general comment. Given the volume's theme, we should be well aware of the pitfalls -and ironies -of applying an 18 th and 19 th century liberal vocabulary of the private and public spheres to describe developments under communism. As many observers have noted, there was strictly speaking never really any real public or private sphere under communism. But to say that the boundaries between public and private were never fixed, and shifted under different conditions, is only the first step; the next one is to analyze how these concepts were put into practice, by the state, social groups and everyday citizens. The history of the GDR dispute commissions, for example, shows how personal property claims were made publicly in order to defend what was seen as the citizen's private sphere. In this case, the private sphere was not hidden, secretive, unrepresented or even repressed, but rather was a key element of the social contract between citizens and the state, even rooted in law, with the approval and encouragement of the state. A similar development could be seen in the famed citizen petitions, or Eingaben. How perceptions of public and private informed notions of identity, subjectivity and citizen behavior across the East Bloc is a challenging question for historians, but it is one that goes to the very heart of everyday life under socialism. 
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Abstract
It is generally assumed that private property was forever banished under communism during the early days of the Russian Revolution. Yet it continued to play a strange and quite powerful role in everyday communist culture from the 1930s on, despite official ideology to the contrary. This essay first considers the political place of private propertyrechristened as "personal property" -in communist life over the decades, with special attention toward the East Bloc after 1945. It then uses the German Democratic Republic's neighborhood-based citizen courts -the so-called Schiedskommissionen, or "dispute commissions" -as a case study of how notions of personal property shaped neighborhood conflict at the local level. At issue is to explore how citizens ably exploited the constitutional guarantees of personal property to advance private claims of social justice and modest material compensation before their peers in these informal social courts. As a consequence, these court records cast a new light on the relationship between the public and private spheres under East Bloc socialism.
Résumé
Selon l'opinion courante, la propriété privée aurait été abolie sous le communisme dans les années qui ont suivi la révolution russe. En réalité, elle a continué à jouer un rôle paradoxal dans la culture communiste quotidienne dès les années 1930 et ceci en dépit des dénégations idéologiques. Cette contribution analyse dans un premier temps le rôle politique que joue la propriété privée rebaptisée « propriété personnelle » dans le communisme et particulièrement dans les pays du bloc socialiste après 1945. En utilisant les sources des tribunaux arbitraux de RDA, on analyse ensuite la manière dont les questions de propriété privée informent sur les conflits de voisinage. L'enjeu est de
